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Green SOX for Investors: Requiring Companies to
Disclose Risks Related to Climate Change

i. introduction

Before aig and lehman brothers rocked the global economy,1 Enron and
WorldCom changed the face of corporate accounting and financial reporting in
corporate America.2 With the subsequent enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in
July 2002,3 congressional legislators directed federal regulators to give greater
attention to the quality of corporate disclosures to investors and to the general
public.4 Sarbanes-Oxley, or “SOX,” introduced important changes in financial
reporting, corporate governance, accountability, and enforcement.5 Since its
passage, SOX has essentially redefined corporate accounting practices and
transparency, but has produced mixed results in the marketplace.6 Nevertheless, its

© 2010 Joey Tsu-Yi Chen.
*
J.D. Candidate 2010, University of Maryland School of Law; M.S., University of Rochester School of
Medicine & Dentistry, 2003; B.S., University of Rochester School of Arts & Sciences, 1999. I would like to
extend special thanks to Cara Lewis and Mindy Ehrenfried for their invaluable comments, and to Professor
Rena Steinzor, Terina Chen, and the Journal of Business & Technology Law Executive Board, for their insight and
support.
1. See Susanne Craig et al., AIG, Lehman Shock Hits World Markets, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2008, at A1
(reporting that the downfall of Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, two of Wall Street’s biggest firms, and AIG
“sent markets across the globe tumbling”).
2. See C. William Thomas, Enron and Beyond: What’s the ‘WorldCom’ing to?, CPA J., Jan. 2003, at 8, 11
(noting that in the aftermath of the scandals, the U.S. economy was likely to see tighter regulation and
additional costs for audits and public oversight). The Enron and WorldCom scandals ultimately cost investors
billions of dollars in losses and led to thousands of Americans losing their jobs. Elizabeth A. Nowicki, 10(b) or
Not 10(b)?: Yanking the Security Blanket for Attorneys in Securities Litigation, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 637, 712
n.286.
3. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C. (2006)).
4. See Onnig H. Dombalagian, Choice of Law and Capital Markets Regulation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1903, 1926
(2008). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was Congress’s immediate response to the Enron and WorldCom scandals.
Catherine Shakespeare, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Five Years on: What Have We Learned?, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L.
333, 333 (2008).
5. See generally Byron F. Egan, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Its Expanding Reach, 40 TEX. J. BUS. L. 305, 309
(2005) (providing a detailed overview of the scope and provisions of SOX).
6. LARA BERGEN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 AND ITS EFFECTS ON AMERICAN BUSINESS (2005),
http://www.financialforum.umb.edu/documents/Sarbanes-Oxley.pdf.
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importance has been compared to the Securities Act of 19337 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 19348.9
SOX, with its call for greater transparency in corporate disclosures, also carried
implications for corporate environmental matters.10 Although companies were
already required under existing federal laws and regulations to disclose certain
environmental costs and liabilities,11 SOX requires corporate officers to personally
certify that their companies have controls and procedures in place to ensure the
disclosure of material environmental information.12 Such internal controls can
significantly impact adequate disclosure of environmental risks.13 Environmental
risks have widespread relevance across numerous American business sectors given
the increased global attention to climate change, greater large-scale efforts to
combat its effects, pending congressional legislation concerning the regulation of

7.
8.
9.

15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006).
Id. §§ 78a–78kk.
Peter Ferola, The Role of Audit Committees in the Wake of Corporate Federalism: Sarbanes-Oxley’s Creep
into State Corporate Law, 7 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 143, 143 (2007) (“The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 . . .
brought about one of the most sweeping reforms since the passage of the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 during the New Deal administration.” (footnote omitted)). SOX amends both
the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act. Egan, supra note 5, at 309. SOX focuses on four goals:
(1) [I]mproving the “tone at the top” by requiring CEOs and CFOs to certify financial statements;
(2) remedying the complex reporting and inadequate accounting methods that hid critical
information; (3) improving corporate internal controls and auditor performance; and (4) creating a
tougher enforcement environment by enhancing penalties and adding investigatory personnel at
the SEC.
J. Travis Laster & Michelle D. Morris, How to Avoid a Collision Between the Delaware Annual Meeting
Requirement and the Federal Proxy Rules, 10 DEL. L. REV. 213, 245 (2008). SOX expands the SEC’s mandate to
include “fighting fraud through corporate governance reform.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Jeffrey Y. Wu, Revisiting Business Roundtable and Section 19(c) in the Wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 23 YALE J.
ON REG. 249, 249 (2006)).
10. Francis X. Lyons, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Changing Face of Environmental Liability Disclosure
Obligations, ABA TRENDS, Nov./Dec. 2003, at 10, 11 (discussing the potential changes in environmental
disclosure requirements for companies under SOX’s requirement “that corporate officers certify that adequate
controls and procedures are in place to accurately disclose material changes in a company’s financial condition
or results of operations”).
11. See infra Part II.A. For example, as discussed later in Part II, SEC regulations required companies to
disclose any pending environmentally related legal proceedings outside the course of ordinary routine litigation
incidental to business dealings. 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2009). Thus, a company had to disclose environmental
proceedings wherein the company anticipated that the government could impose fines in excess of $100,000.
Jeff A. Jones, Financial Disclosure Requirements for Hazardous Waste Liabilities, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 137, 142
(1999). On February 8, 2010, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) issued an interpretive guidance
(“Release”) to assist public companies with disclosing material information related to climate change
developments. See Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, Securities Act
Release No. 9106, Exchange Act Release No. 61,469, 75 Fed. Reg. 6,290 (Feb. 8, 2010). The Release does not
purport to create new requirements or modify existing ones; rather, it raises contexts under which affected
companies should conduct a materiality analysis for the purposes of disclosure. See infra Part II.C.
12. See 15 U.S.C. § 7241; Lyons, supra note 10, at 10.
13. See Lyons, supra note 10, at 11 (“Companies will put themselves at great risk if they do not have
adequate internal systems in place to make an appropriate determination of potential environmental costs and
liabilities and the need for disclosure of this information.”).
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greenhouse gases, and consumer-driven, pro-environment awareness.14 Yet despite
SOX, federal reporting requirements are a low bar to which public companies must
hold themselves accountable for such risks.15 For example, a recent study
commissioned by the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies
(“Ceres”) and the Environmental Defense Fund revealed “limited” disclosure of
risks related to climate change in 100 global companies in five sectors targeted for a
low-carbon future.16 Such risks include: (1) physical risk from climate change; (2)
regulatory risks related to greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions limits; and (3)
litigation risks.17 Now that courts have begun to allow interested parties to bring
lawsuits related to global warming,18 more and more American companies are likely
to face significant costs, liabilities, and risks arising out of environmental issues.19
There is a strong policy argument in favor of communicating corporate
environmental risks, in addition to other risks affecting corporate financial
performance and sustainability, to “Joe the Investor” to permit Joe to process and

14. See Katayun I. Jaffari, SEC Reporting Companies: Are Your Disclosures About Climate Change Risks
Adequate?, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 28, 2009, at 7 (noting that climate change remains a “critical issue in the
United States and across the globe[,]” dominating headlines and “affecting companies and business
environments throughout the world”).
15. See infra Part V.A.
16. THE CORPORATE LIBRARY, CLIMATE RISK DISCLOSURE IN SEC FILINGS: AN ANALYSIS OF 10-K REPORTING
BY OIL AND GAS, INSURANCE, COAL, TRANSPORTATION AND ELECTRIC POWER COMPANIES 34 (2009), available at
http://www.ceres.org/Document.Doc?id=473. A low-carbon future implies structuring an economy supported
by cleaner, more efficient and sustainable energy in order to reduce carbon dioxide and other GHG emissions
and mitigate the effects of climate change. See THE ROYAL SOCIETY, TOWARDS A LOW CARBON FUTURE:
SCIENTIFIC DISCUSSION MEETING 1 (2009).
17. THE CORPORATE LIBRARY, supra note 16, at 2–3.
18. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 526 (2007); Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855,
859–60 (5th Cir. 2009), reh’g granted en banc, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co.,
582 F.3d 309, 315 (2d Cir. 2009).
19. See Jaffari, supra note 14, (“[C]ompanies must grapple with the key issues that climate change poses:
financial risks, opportunities and potential costs, as well as physical risks to corporate facilities and
operations.”); David B.H. Martin, A New Season for Environmental Risk Factors and Related Disclosures, in 41ST
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION, at 979, 981 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbook
Series No. 1773, 2009); see also Comer, 585 F.3d at 859–60 (reversing the lower court’s dismissal of the case on
the basis of standing and, thus, allowing the fourteen class action plaintiffs to bring their common law claims
against defendant industries for compensatory and punitive damages). On February 26, 2010, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided to rehear the case en banc, vacating the three-member panel decision.
Comer, 598 F.3d at 210. The court recently dismissed the en banc hearing, canceling oral arguments for lack of
quorum to hear the case en banc. Global Environmental Law, http://globalenvironmentallaw.blogspot.com/
2010/05/gulf-oil-spill-comer-en-banc-dismissed.html (May 2, 2010, 11:53). Presumably, a dismissal of the
appeal for reasons other than on the merits of the case will likely lead to an appeal to the Supreme Court. See id.
Interestingly, the plaintiffs in Comer seek to recover solely monetary damages, not equitable relief. Comer, 585
F.3d at 859–60. While courts have yet to decide a global warming lawsuit involving private parties on the merits,
corporate defendants still incur significant costs in the defense. Jennifer Koons, Courts Follow Landmark 2nd
Circuit Ruling with 2 Greenhouse Gas Decisions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/
10/19/19greenwire-courts-follow-landmark-2nd-circuit-ruling-with-62336.html?pagewanted=1. Furthermore,
the lawsuits themselves may encourage additional common law-based global warming litigation. Id.
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use this information in his decision-making.20 Additionally, the heightened interest
in shareholder access in recent years suggests one possible means by which investors
can effect changes in social policy—through corporate governance.21 In lateOctober 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) advanced
shareholder interest in corporate governance when it announced that shareholder
resolutions may inquire into major social policy issues, from climate change to
subprime lending.22 The decision reversed the agency’s previous policy that allowed
companies to exclude “shareholder resolutions requesting information on the
financial risks associated with environmental, human rights and other social issues
facing companies.”23
Within the business community, the impact of environmental risks on American
companies can range from tangible liabilities, such as lawsuit damages from
hazardous waste litigation and public nuisance,24 to unquantifiable complexities,
such as uncertainties associated with climate change.25 For example, with more than
half of our electricity coming from coal-fired power plants, the anticipated
regulation of carbon dioxide emissions and other greenhouse gases (from burning
of fossil fuels) will substantially impact American energy and utility companies.26 In

20. See Steven L. Bray, Comment, Sealing the Conceptual Cracks in the SEC’s Environmental Disclosure
Rules: A Risk Communication Approach, 18 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 655, 656 (1997) (noting the fundamental
purpose of environmental disclosure “is to achieve a nation’s public policy goals through the communication of
environmental risk to the public” such that the public can use this information and act on it).
21. Thomas Joo, Global Warming and the Management-Centered Corporation, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671,
671 (2009).
22. SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14E (CF) (Oct. 27, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/
interps/legal/cfslb14e.htm.
23. Posting to Corporate Disclosure Alert, http://corporatedisclosurealert.blogspot.com/ (Oct. 27, 2009,
6:21 EST).
24. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that plaintiff
states, New York City, and environmental groups had standing to allege a common law public nuisance cause of
action against five of the nation’s largest coal-burning utility companies for their unchecked greenhouse gas
emissions and supposed contributions to global warming); Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l., Inc., 399
F.3d 248, 252 (3d Cir. 2005) (affirming the lower court’s judgment requiring a chemical manufacturer to
excavate over one million tons of hexavalent chromium waste).
25. Richenda Connell et al., Evaluating the Private Sector Perspective on the Financial Risks of Climate
Change, 15 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y/HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 133, 135
(2009) (“The challenges to an integrated assessment of the risks and opportunities arising from climate change
lie in great part in a number of underlying uncertainties. Further complicating the matter is that much of the
climate change modeling produces forecasts for outcomes several decades hence.”).
26. On December 15, 2009, the EPA published a final ruling of endangerment, finding that CO2 and five
other GHGs “taken in combination endanger both the public health and the public welfare of current and
future generations.” Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,496–97 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.). The
EPA has since issued a rule requiring the mandatory reporting of GHGs by specific industry sectors. See
Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,260, 56,260 (Oct. 30, 2009) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts 86, 87, 89, 90, 94, 98, 1033, 1039, 1042, 1045, 1048, 1051, 1054, 1065). Congressional legislators have
also proposed a national cap-and-trade system for mitigating GHG emissions. American Clean Energy and
Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 701(b) (2009). Additionally, several states have initiated efforts
to reduce GHG emissions and combat climate change. THE CORPORATE LIBRARY, supra note 16, at 2.
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light of these risks, what should a company disclose in its financial reports? What
must a company disclose? These questions lead to the central issue of whether the
United States employs an environmental risk disclosure system that adequately
protects consumer and investor interests in the face of shifting financial, legal, and
environmental issues related to climate change.27
While public confidence in the federal financial regulatory system has suffered in
the wake of corporate scandals and the recent credit crisis, other nations seem to do
a better job of equipping investors for dealing with evolving environmental risks.28
For example, the European Union (“E.U.”) has adopted a “precautionary principle”
approach toward its environmental policy,29 which serves as the basis for its risk
regulation.30 Likewise, companies may elect to participate in the E.U.’s voluntary
corporate environmental reporting system aimed at promoting companies that
demonstrate “superior environmental performance.”31 Finally, the E.U. operates a
trading scheme for GHG emission allowances whereby large industrial emitters of
GHGs are required to monitor and report their GHG emissions.32 These programs
appear to offer both socially conscious investors and the general public a greater
degree of transparency than the U.S. system.
This Comment examines corporate disclosure requirements under current U.S.
reporting standards with respect to environmental risks associated with climate
change and concludes that current federal securities laws fail to ensure adequate
environmental risk disclosure. Section II gives a brief account of environmental
reporting obligations in the United States.33 Section III outlines the legal basis and
regulatory framework for the Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”)
mandatory reporting rule for GHG emissions and other early initiatives aimed
towards regulating GHG emissions.34 Section IV briefly summarizes the
environmental reporting scheme employed by the E.U.35 Finally, Section V discusses
the purpose and merits for heightened disclosure of environmental risks, using

27.
28.
29.

See infra Part V.
See infra Part IV.
Jonathan B. Wiener, Whose Precaution After All? A Comment on the Comparison and Evolution of Risk
Regulatory Systems, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 207, 209–10 (2003). For an explanation of the “precautionary
principle,” see id. at 210 n.11. Briefly, the precautionary principle refers to the principle of adopting
precautionary measures, such as regulations, “to prevent an uncertain future risk in advance of complete
evidence about the risk.” Id. In other words, preventative actions are not postponed for lack of full scientific
certainty. Id.
30. See id. at 209–11.
31. See William L. Thomas, The Green Nexus: Financiers and Sustainable Development, 13 GEO. INT’L
ENVTL. L. REV. 899, 917–18 (2001).
32. Council Directive 2003/87/EC, Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Within
the Community and Amending Council Directive 96/61/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 28, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:2003L0087:20090625:EN:PDF.
33. See infra Part II.
34. See infra Part III.
35. See infra Part IV.
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climate change as an example context, and presents an argument for statutory
requirements to promote this reform.36 This Comment adopts the position that
Congress should amend SOX to require heightened environmental disclosure
requirements with regard to climate change risks.37 Specifically, SOX should require
that public companies disclose their GHG emissions.38 Additionally, SOX should be
amended to direct the SEC and EPA to formalize an agreement to share
information and improve the coordination between the two agencies.39
ii. u.s. financial reporting requirements for environmental matters

Since the 1930s, Congress has enacted numerous provisions aimed at protecting the
American investor.40 With the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Congress established
the SEC,41 the federal agency responsible for administering several federal laws,
including the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and
SOX.42 The SEC has the legal authority to establish and enforce standards
concerning financial accounting, reporting, and disclosure.43 Historically, however,
the SEC has relied on the private sector, namely the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (“FASB”), to promulgate rules and guidelines for financial reporting.44 The
SEC identifies emerging financial reporting issues and refers these issues to FASB,
which sets the appropriate accounting standards but does not have any enforcement
authority.45 The SEC then uses its authority to enforce the FASB standards.46 While
an in-depth discussion of the nearly 170 FASB statements exceeds the scope of this
Comment, one rule in particular, Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No.
5 (“SFAS 5”) provides:


36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
See infra Part VI.B.
See infra Part VI.B.
See Albert J. Matricciani, Jr., Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.:
Substitution of Congressional Intent with Caveat Emptor, 4 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 187, 188–89 (2009).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2006).
42. 69 AM. JUR. 2D Securities Regulation–Federal § 1 (2008).
43. CLYDE P. STICKNEY & ROMAN L. WEIL, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING: AN INTRODUCTION TO CONCEPTS,
METHODS AND USES 21 (11th ed. 2006).
44. FASB, Facts About FASB, http://www.fasb.org/facts/ (last visited May 19, 2010).
45. The Roles of the SEC and the FASB in Establishing GAAP: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital
Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 107th Cong.
(2002), http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/051402tsrkh.htm (statement of Robert K. Herdman, Chief
Accountant, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission).
46. See 15 U.S.C. § 77s (authorizing the SEC to make and enforce rules and regulations concerning
corporate financial reporting). The statute also permits the Commission to recognize “any accounting
principles established by a standard setting body.” Id. § 77s(b).
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An estimated loss from a loss contingency47 . . . shall be accrued by a charge
to income if . . . [i]nformation available prior to issuance of the financial
statements indicates that it is probable that an asset had been impaired or a
liability had been incurred at the date of the financial statements . . . [and]
[t]he amount of loss can be reasonably estimated. If no accrual is made for
a loss contingency [under the aforementioned conditions] . . . disclosure of
the contingency shall be made when there is at least a reasonable possibility
that a loss or an additional loss may have been incurred.48
Essentially, SFAS 5 requires the disclosure of environmental liabilities as loss
contingencies if a company incurs and can reasonably estimate losses arising from
environmental liabilities or risks.49 Thus, for example, a chemical company would
be required to disclose loss contingencies related to hazardous waste cleanup if the
company is classified as a potentially responsible party for a Superfund site.50 Apart
from accounting standards, such as SFAS 5, which prompts disclosure of
environmental loss contingencies, regulations directly issued by the SEC also
require disclosure of material information related to environmental compliance and
governmental action pursued thereto.51
A. Environmental Disclosure Requirements Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley
The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 direct
publicly registered companies to disclose three types of environmentally related
information in their financial filings with the SEC.52 They include: (1) material
effects of the registrant’s compliance with environmental laws and regulations;53 (2)

47. FASB defines a contingency as “an existing condition, situation, or set of circumstances involving
uncertainty as to possible gain . . . or loss . . . to an enterprise that will ultimately be resolved when one or more
future events occur or fail to occur.” FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS NO. 5: ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES 4 (1975).
48. Id. at 5–6.
49. Id.
50. Jones, supra note 11, at 160–61 (describing an SEC cease and desist order issued against Lee
Pharmaceutical for material misrepresentations in its financial statements). In 1998, the SEC took action against
Lee Pharmaceutical, charging the company with failure to accrue and disclose material estimates of its
environmental liabilities and cleanup costs concerning its designation as a potentially responsible party for a
Superfund hazardous waste contamination site. Id. at 159–60.
51. See infra Part II.A.
52. For an overview of corporate disclosure requirements regarding environmental matters, see Richard M.
Schwartz & Donna Mussio, Environmental Disclosure Requirements Under the Federal Securities Laws, in
CONDUCTING DUE DILIGENCE IN M&A AND SECURITIES OFFERINGS 2009, at 259 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice,
Course Handbook Series No. 1746, 2009) [hereinafter Schwartz & Mussio, Environmental Disclosure].
53. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(xii) (2009) (requiring the registrant to disclose the material costs of complying,
or failing to comply, with federal, state, or local provisions regarding pollution discharge or related to the
protection of the environment).
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pending material environmental legal proceedings;54 and (3) discussion and analysis
of the registrant’s financial condition and contingent liabilities in financial
statements.55 These environmental disclosure requirements are commonly referred
to as Items 101, 103, and 303 (respectively) of the SEC’s Regulation S-K.56
Regulation S-K also includes Item 503(c), which requires companies registering
with the SEC to disclose in their Prospectus summaries “the most significant factors
that make the offering speculative or risky,” although the enumerated risk factors
do not specifically include, but leave open for consideration, environmental risks.57
Materiality becomes the operative word when corporate managers decide
whether to disclose environmental costs, liabilities, or risks under Regulation S-K.58
Item 101 requires a company to disclose “the material effects . . . [of complying]
with Federal, State and local . . . [laws] which have been enacted or adopted
regulating the discharge of materials into the environment, or otherwise relating to
the protection of the environment . . . .”59 Likewise with Item 103, a company must
include a description of “any material pending legal proceedings, other than
ordinary routine litigation incidental to the business, to which the registrant or any
of its subsidiaries is a party . . . .”60 While Item 101 clearly calls for disclosure of the
material effects of environmental compliance on a company’s capital expenditures,
earnings, and competitive position,61 Item 103 arguably applies to environmental
liabilities on the assumption that environmental litigation falls outside the sphere of
ordinary routine litigation.62

54. Id. § 229.103 (requiring the registrant to disclose proceedings outside the course of ordinary routine
litigation incidental to the business).
55. Id. § 229.303 (requiring the registrant to disclose environmentally related contingencies in the
Management’s Discussion and Analysis, including known trends or demands, events, and uncertainties that are
likely to have a material effect on the registrant’s operational income and potential liability).
56. Richard M. Schwartz & Donna Mussio, Environmental Due Diligence for Securities Offerings, in
CONDUCTING DUE DILIGENCE IN M&A AND SECURITIES OFFERINGS 2009, at 229, 239 (PLI Corporate Law &
Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 1746, 2009) [hereinafter Schwartz & Mussio, Due Diligence].
57. 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c). In its recent interpretive guidance, the SEC recommends that companies refrain
from disclosing generic risks. Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change,
Securities Act Release No. 9106, Exchange Act Release No. 61,469, 75 Fed. Reg. 6,290, 6,296 (Feb. 8, 2010).
Instead, companies should consider disclosing only “specific risks they face as a result of climate change
legislation or regulation.” Id.
58. See David Monsma & Timothy Olson, Muddling Through Counterfactual Materiality and Divergent
Disclosure: The Necessary Search for a Duty to Disclose Material Non-Financial Information, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
137, 147 (2007) (“The threshold question under securities law for any reporting decision is whether
information is ‘material.’”).
59. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1)(xii) (emphasis added).
60. Id. § 229.103. (emphasis added).
61. Id. § 229.101(c)(1)(xii).
62. Gregory A. Bibler & Christopher P. Davis, Disclosing Environmental Liabilities in the Wake of SarbanesOxley, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Apr. 2003, at 2 (“Environmental litigation is categorically not ‘ordinary’
or ‘routine.’”). Moreover, according to the SEC, actions contemplated by government authorities also fall
within the ambit of Item 103. Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed.
Reg. at 6,293 (citing Instruction 5 to Item 103).
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How does one define what is “material”? The Supreme Court of the United
States considered the definition of materiality and established a standard for
materiality in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.63 The Court held that a fact may
be considered “material” if “there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote.”64 Writing for the
majority, Justice Marshall explained that the purpose of the materiality standard “is
not merely to ensure by judicial means that the transaction . . . is fair and otherwise
adequate, but to ensure disclosures by corporate management in order to enable the
shareholders to make an informed choice.”65 In so holding, the Court cautioned
against setting a standard for materiality that was unnecessarily low, which would
unduly burden both the shareholder and company.66 Instead, the Court looked to
whether there was a substantial likelihood that the omitted fact, in the eyes of a
reasonable investor, would have changed the “total mix of information made
available.”67
Item 303 of Regulation S-K calls for discussion of various segments of a
company’s business and provides guidance for inclusion of a Management
Discussion and Analysis (“MD&A”) section.68 In their SEC filings, companies are
required to include an MD&A section in which they must discuss and analyze
trends, demands, commitments, events, and uncertainties that, in the
management’s judgment, are reasonably likely to materially impact a company’s
liquidity, financial condition, or operating results.69 Known trends and uncertainties
may include environmental risks, though Item 303 does not specifically state that
these risks must be discussed in this section.70 Rather, the decision to include


63. 426 U.S. 438, 443–44, 449 (1976). In TSC Industries, the plaintiff challenged a joint proxy statement
issued by the defendant companies, alleging that it was incomplete and materially misleading. Id. at 440–41.
National Industries had acquired TSC Industries and placed five of its own members on the TSC board of
directors. Id. at 440. The new board subsequently voted to liquidate and sell off TSC’s assets. Id. at 440–41. The
plaintiff, a TSC shareholder, objected, claiming the companies’ joint proxy statement failed to disclose the
extent of National’s control over the TSC board. Id. at 441–42. The Supreme Court concluded the alleged
omissions were not material as to warrant granting summary judgment, as the additional facts concerning the
board’s new membership were not “so obviously important that reasonable minds could not differ on their
materiality.” Id. at 452–53.
64. Id. at 449. The Supreme Court has since upheld the definition of “materiality” in subsequent cases. See
Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1090 (1991); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32
(1988).
65. TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 448.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 449 (quotation marks omitted).
68. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2009).
69. Id.
70. See ROBERT REPETTO & DUNCAN AUSTIN, COMING CLEAN: CORPORATE DISCLOSURE OF FINANCIALLY
SIGNIFICANT ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS 7 (Kathleen Lynch ed., 2000) (“Disclosure requirements of known
uncertainties under Item 303 of Regulation S-K could reasonably apply to environmental uncertainties.”).
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environmental matters centers on what corporate mangers determine to be
“material.”71
B. Disclosure Requirements Under Sarbanes-Oxley
In the wake of a series of high-profile corporate and accounting scandals, Congress
enacted SOX.72 SOX includes statutory provisions for heightened corporate
responsibility and accountability, which were intended to increase the quality of
corporate financial reporting.73 For example, section 302 of SOX binds the
signatures of corporate officers to the truthfulness of the company’s financial
statements.74 In essence, SOX requires that a company’s highest executives attest to
the accuracy of each corporate SEC filing, certifying that they “personally reviewed
their companies’ controls and procedures to . . . disclose material changes in
financial conditions and results of company operations, including expectations of
future performance.”75 SOX did not, however, expand a company’s duty to disclose
beyond those costs and liabilities that were material,76 and the SEC has since upheld
the TSC Industries’ “reasonable investor” test.77
SOX also directed the SEC to adopt amendments to the MD&A requirements.78
The SEC later proposed expanding MD&A disclosure provisions to include rules

71. Id. (“Disclosure of environmental exposures is governed both by the SEC’s core rules on materiality
and by specific requirements regarding environmental liabilities and compliance with federal and state
environmental regulations.”).
72. Allison Fass, One Year Later, the Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley, FORBES.COM, July 22, 2003, http://
www.forbes.com/2003/07/22/cz_af_0722sarbanes.html. Congress enacted SOX immediately in response to a
wave of corporate accounting scandals that included giants such as Enron and WorldCom. See supra note 2.
Those scandals “exposed weaknesses in corporate governance, audit practices, and financial reporting.” U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 401(C) OF THE SARBANESOXLEY ACT OF 2002 ON ARRANGEMENTS WITH OFF-BALANCE SHEET IMPLICATIONS, SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITIES,
AND TRANSPARENCY OF FILINGS BY ISSUERS 1 (2005).
73. Egan, supra note 5, at 309 (stating that SOX aimed to protect investors “by improving the accuracy and
reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws”).
74. Section 302 provides: “[B]ased on such officer’s knowledge, the financial statements, and other
financial information included in the report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition and
results of operations of the issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in the report . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(3)
(2006) (emphasis added).
75. Bibler & Davis, supra note 62, at 1.
76. Id. at 2.
77. Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, Securities Act Release No.
9106, Exchange Act Release No. 61,469, 75 Fed. Reg. 6,290, 6,292–93 (Feb. 8, 2010) (upholding the TSC
Industries materiality standard where “there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider
it important in deciding how to vote or make an investment decision”); see infra Part II.C.
78. Isobel A. Jones, Management’s Discussion and Analysis in SEC Related Documents, in PREPARATION OF
ANNUAL DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS 2008, at 421, 428 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series
No. 1640, 2008) (“SEC adopted amendments to the MD&A requirements mandating specific disclosure
concerning off-balance sheet arrangements and contractual obligations . . . .”). Section 401(c) of SOX required
the SEC to conduct a study and report inter alia any recommendations for “improving the transparency and
quality of reporting off-balance sheet transactions in the financial statements and disclosures required to be
filed by an issuer with the Commission.” 15 U.S.C. § 7261(c).
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related to off-balance sheet arrangements, contractual obligations, and contingent
liabilities and commitments.79 With regard to specific environmental disclosures,
such as GHG emissions, however, the restriction of materiality, as evaluated under
the reasonable investor test, continues to limit the extent to which corporate entities
must disclose the environmental effects of their operations and products.80
Shortly after SOX’s enactment, some practitioners argued that SOX’s
requirement that corporate executives personally certify their company’s internal
controls and procedures changed the context for Regulation S-K’s environmental
disclosure requirements.81 That senior executives and counsel could be held
personally accountable for the accuracy of these internal controls purportedly
prompted companies to “reevaluate their procedures for estimating and disclosing
environmental compliance costs and liabilities.”82 Companies were now “on notice
that they should be able to point to an established protocol for identifying, tracking,
quantifying, and assessing the materiality of environmental matters.”83
C. SEC Interpretive Guidance on Disclosures Related to Climate Change
Earlier this year, in response to several calls for greater guidance on corporate
environmental disclosures, the SEC issued an interpretive release (“Release”)
concerning corporate disclosures related to climate change.84 At a January 27, 2010
open Commission meeting, SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro expressly noted that the
“interpretive release . . . does not create new legal requirements or modify existing
ones—it is merely intended to provide clarity and enhance consistency.”85 In
addition to summarizing existing disclosure requirements under federal law,86 the
release reinforces the SEC’s adoption of the long-standing TSC Industries

79. GOODWIN PROCTER, SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002: SEC PROPOSES NEW MD&A DISCLOSURE RULES
RELATING TO OFF-BALANCE SHEET ARRANGEMENTS, CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS AND CONTINGENT LIABILITIES
AND COMMITMENTS 2–4 (2002). Pursuant to section 401(c) of SOX, the SEC conducted a study of off-balance
sheet arrangements to determine whether corporate financial statements “transparently reflect[ed] the
economics of off-balance sheet arrangements.” U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N., supra note 72, at 1. The
Commission defined “off-balance sheet” to include “investments in the equity of other entities, transfers of
financial assets . . . , certain retirement arrangements, leases, contingent obligations and guarantees, derivatives,
and other contractual obligations . . . .” Id.
80. See David W. Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting as Informational Regulation: A Law and
Economics Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 379, 408 (2005) (noting that the SEC views the economic materiality
standard as a filter limiting information disclosure).
81. Bibler & Davis, supra note 62, at 2.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, Securities Act Release No.
9106, Exchange Act Release No. 61,469, 75 Fed. Reg. 6,290 (Feb. 8, 2010).
85. Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement Before the Open Commission
Meeting on Disclosure Related to Business or Legislative Events on the Issue of Climate Change (Jan. 27, 2010),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch012710mls-climate.htm.
86. Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg. at 6,293–95.
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materiality standard,87 and reiterates the two-step process for determining “the
materiality of known trends, events or uncertainties,” previously described in a
1989 Release.88 Accordingly, company managers must first ask whether the trend,
demand, commitment, event or, uncertainty (collectively, “event”) is reasonably
likely to occur.89 If not, then management need not disclose.90 On the other hand, if
management cannot determine the likelihood of such an occurrence, then
management must presume the event will occur, and it must disclose any material
effect the event will likely have on the company’s financial condition.91
Specifically with regard to climate change-related disclosures, the February 2010
release describes examples of climate change developments which may trigger
material disclosures.92 For example, pending federal legislation regulating GHG
emissions under a cap and trade system may require companies directly affected by
this action—e.g., energy and utility companies—to disclose their regulatory risks
following the prescribed two-step materiality analysis.93 Affected companies may
need to disclose:
-Costs related to the trading of emissions allowances or credits;94
-Compliance costs associated with facility and equipment upgrades to
reduce GHG emissions;95
-Changes in profits or losses reflecting changes in consumer demand as a
result of the legislation.96
The SEC also recommends that companies affected by foreign treaties and
international accords (concerning climate change) should consider disclosing the
material impact these laws may have on their businesses.97
The Release recognizes that climate change developments may indirectly affect
registered companies through shifting business and consumer trends that create
either new opportunities or new risks.98 Consequently, these businesses may be
required to disclose risks related to:
-Decreased demand for certain carbon-intensive goods;99
-Increased competition to develop innovative new, “cleaner” products;100

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
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Id. at 6,295.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6,295–96.
Id. at 6,296.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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-Shifting consumer demand from carbon-based energy (and related
services) towards alternative energy.101
Finally, the physical manifestations of a changing climate may bear significant
consequences for a company’s operations.102 For example, changes in severe weather
and the availability of natural resources can disrupt manufacturing and distribution
processes, leading to financial losses or increased liabilities.103 According to the SEC,
businesses vulnerable to the physical consequences of climate change “should
consider disclosing material risks . . . in their publicly filed disclosure documents.”104
Notably, the Release does not command disclosure for the listed climate change
events. Rather, it presents situations that may compel a company to make a
materiality determination before disclosure.105
D. ASTM Standards for Environmental Disclosures
It is worthwhile to mention two additional standards, albeit voluntary, whereby
companies disclose environmental liabilities or contingencies. In 2002, the
American Society of Testing and Materials (“ASTM”) adopted its own standards for
estimating and disclosing environmental liabilities.106 The ASTM International is
one of the world’s largest voluntary standards development organizations,107
responsible for developing technical standards for a range of industry sectors.108
Government agencies have either used ASTM standards in codes, regulations, and
laws, or referred to them for guidance.109
Individual organizations can apply ASTM standards to satisfy federal
requirements for environmental site assessments.110 ASTM published standard guide

100. See id.; see also Am. Inst. Certified Pub. Accountants, News Highlights from April 2010, J. ACCT., Apr.
2010, at 11, 11, available at http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/2010/Apr/Highlights.htm (“In
comments before the commission, Meredith Cross, director of the Division of Corporation Finance, said the
guidance includes examples of indirect consequences such as . . . increased competition to develop innovative
new products to satisfy demand for cleaner goods.”).
101. Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg. at 6296.
102. Id. at 6,296–97.
103. Id. at 6,297.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 6,295–97.
106. Bibler & Davis, supra note 62, at 3.
107. ASTM International, About ASTM International [hereinafter ASTM, About ASTM International]
http://www.astm.org/ABOUT/aboutASTM.html (last visited May 19, 2010). ASTM is a trusted source with a
reputation for producing high technical quality and market relevant standards for materials, products, systems,
and services. Id.
108. Id. ASTM’s members represent “producers, users, consumers, government, and academia from over
100 countries.” ASTM International, Standards Worldwide [hereinafter ASTM, Standards Worldwide]
http://www.astm.org/FAQ/whatisastm_answers.html#anchor2 (last visited May 19, 2010).
109. See ASTM, Standards Worldwide, supra note 108.
110. Id.
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E 2173 for disclosing environmental liabilities,111 as well as another guide for
estimating the monetary costs and liabilities associated with environmental
matters.112 Standard E 2173, which was intended to supplement SEC requirements
and apply to MD&A disclosure of environmental liabilities,113 mandates specific
minimum disclosure requirements when a company believes its “environmental
liability for an individual circumstance or its environmental liability in the
aggregate is material.”114 Although socially responsible groups have petitioned the
SEC to formally adopt the ASTM standards as regulations, E 2173 remains only a
voluntary industry guideline.115
iii. federal regulation of greenhouse gas emissions

In 2007, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Massachusetts v. EPA116
and paved the way for the regulation of climate change.117 In a landmark 5-4
decision, the Court concluded that the EPA has a duty under the Clean Air Act to
regulate emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other GHGs from motor vehicles.118
In that case, a group of states, local governments, and private organizations alleged
that the EPA failed to regulate the emissions of four GHGs, including carbon
dioxide.119 In addition to finding petitioners had standing to sue,120 the Court

111.
112.
113.

ASTM E 2173, http://www.astm.org/Standards/E2173.htm (last visited May 19, 2010).
ASTM E 2137, http://www.astm.org/Standards/E2137.htm (last visited May 19, 2010).
Ridgeway M. Hall, Jr., Policies, Regulations, and Guidelines Relating to Environmental Reporting and
Disclosure and Auditing—Management Systems, in HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES, SITE REMEDIATION, AND
ENFORCEMENT, at 195, 199 (ALI-ABA Continuing Legal Education, Oct. 2003).
114. Bibler & Davis, supra note 62, at 3 (original emphasis omitted). ASTM E 2173’s minimum disclosure
requirements include:
(1) the number of [Superfund] sites for which the company has been named as a [potentially
responsible party (“PRP”)] and the number of claims, suits, actions, demands, requests for
payment, notices, or cases that have been presented to the company; (2) an estimate of the
company’s environmental liabilities and a description of the approach used to estimate those
liabilities; (3) the cost estimation methodology employed by the company for accrued liabilities; (4)
a characterization of any material loss contingencies; and (5) the nature and terms of cost-sharing
arrangements with other PRPs.
Id. at 3–4.
115. Schwartz & Mussio, Environmental Disclosure, supra note 52, at 320–22 (reporting that despite a
petition by the Rose Foundation urging the SEC to adopt the language of the ASTM standards such as E 2173,
the SEC has yet to take any action to make the standard mandatory).
116. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
117. See id. at 532 (concluding that EPA has the statutory authority to regulate GHG emissions).
118. Id. (concluding that CO2 and other greenhouse gases “fit well within the Clean Air Act’s capacious
definition of ‘air pollutant’” and, thus, may be regulated).
119. Id. at 505.
120. The lower court decided the case on the merits. Id. at 514. In a separate opinion concurring only in
judgment, Judge Sentelle wrote that petitioners failed to allege particularized injuries from global warming, and
thus did not satisfy the requirements for Article III standing. Id. at 514–15. On appeal, however, the Supreme
Court found that the State of Massachusetts had standing to sue from the real risk of catastrophic harm, a risk
of harm that could be reduced. Id. at 526.
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recognized the harms associated with climate change and GHG emissions.121 The
Court indicated that the EPA had a duty to mitigate or reduce emissions from
motor vehicles, which make a meaningful contribution to climate change.122 Thus,
the EPA’s failure to do so, without justification for its inaction, was arbitrary and
capricious.123 In reaching this holding, the Court found that carbon dioxide and
other notable GHGs qualified as “air pollutants” under the Clean Air Act.124
On July 30, 2008, the EPA responded to the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Massachusetts v. EPA, as well as to numerous petitions for GHG regulation in the
wake of the Court’s decision, by publishing a proposed rule regarding the
regulation of GHG emissions such as carbon dioxide in certain industry sectors.125
With the announcement, the EPA sought to solicit comments from other agencies
and the general public on the best approach to tackle GHG emissions.126 That same
year, the Consolidated Appropriations Act127 went into effect, which allocated
federal funding for the EPA to “publish a draft rule . . . [requiring] mandatory
reporting of [GHG] emissions above appropriate thresholds in all sectors of the
[U.S.] economy.”128 In April 2009, the EPA formally classified carbon dioxide and
five other GHGs as pollutants under the Clean Air Act.129 In early December 2009,
the Administrator of the EPA signed two final findings concerning GHG
emissions.130 First, the Administrator concluded that the six newly classified GHG
pollutants pose a threat to the health and welfare of the general public.131 Second,
the combined emissions of these gases “from new motor vehicles and new motor
vehicle engines contribute to the [GHG] pollution which threatens public health
and welfare.”132

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 521.
Id. at 525.
Id. at 534.
Id. at 532.
Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354, 44,354 (proposed
July 30, 2008) (noting that petitions to the EPA asked the agency to “regulate GHG emissions from ships,
aircraft and nonroad vehicles such as farm and construction equipment”).
126. Id.
127. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844 (2007).
128. Id. at 2128. The EPA has since stated that “suppliers of fossil fuels or industrial greenhouse gases,
manufacturers of vehicles and engines, and facilities that emit 25,000 metric tons or more per year of GHG
emissions are required to submit annual reports to EPA.” EPA, Final Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse
Gases Rule, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/ghgrulemaking.html (last visited May 19, 2010).
129. John M. Broder, E.P.A. Clears Way for Greenhouse Gas Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/18/science/earth/18endanger.html (noting that the EPA’s decision was based
on scientific analysis that revealed unprecedented levels of carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide,
hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride, which were likely “responsible for an increase
in average temperatures and other climate changes”).
130. U.S. EPA, Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under the Clean Air
Act, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment.html (last visited May 19, 2010).
131. Id.
132. Id.
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In light of such endangerment and contributory findings, the regulation of GHG
emissions would soon follow. In April 2009, the EPA proposed to mandate
“reporting of [GHG] emissions from all sectors of the economy,” including direct
emitting sources and fossil fuel and industrial gas suppliers.133 After the notice and
comment period for administrative rulemaking, the EPA finalized the rule on
October 30, 2009.134 While the EPA’s mandatory reporting rule does not require
companies to control or limit the emission of the six identified GHGs, it does
require that affected facilities—e.g., fossil fuel electric-generating units,
incinerators, crude petroleum extractors and refineries, plastic product
manufacturers, pulp and paper mills, chemical manufacturers, mobile sources, and
suppliers of GHGs135—account for all emissions of the listed GHGs above the
prescribed threshold.136 For example, any facility that cumulatively emits 25,000
metric tons of carbon dioxide-equivalent (or more) had to begin collecting data on
its CO2 emissions in January 2010 and report every year thereafter.137
On May 13, 2010, the EPA announced a final rule addressing GHG emissions
from the largest emitters of GHGs—stationary sources such as power plants and oil
refineries.138 The rule adopts a “phased-in approach” to regulating GHGs under
Title V of the Clean Air Act by establishing a threshold for GHG emissions above
which stationary sources would be required to obtain a Clean Air Act operating
permit.139 Beginning in January 2011, GHG permitting requirements will apply to
large facilities already subject to Clean Air Act Title V permitting for non-GHG
pollutants.140 Then in July 2011, the Title V permitting requirements for GHGs will
extend to other large stationary emitters of GHGs.141 Under the new rule, regulated


133.
134.

Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 16,448, 16,448 (proposed Apr. 10, 2009).
Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,260 (Oct. 30, 2009) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts 86, 87, 89, 90, 94. 98, 1033, 1039, 1042, 1045, 1048, 1051, 1054, 1065).
135. EPA’s list of example facilities likely to be affected by the mandatory GHG reporting requirement is
extensive. See id. at 56,260–61.
136. See id. at 56,266–67.
137. Id. at 56,267.
138. Press Release, U.S. EPA, EPA Sets Thresholds for Greenhouse Gas Permitting Requirements (May 13,
2010), http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/Press_Releases_By_Date!OpenView (follow “05/13/201 EPA
Sets Thresholds for Greenhouse Gas Permitting Requirements” hyperlink). EPA proposed the rule in October
2009. See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 74 Fed. Reg.
55,292 (proposed Oct. 27, 2009).
139. U.S. EPA, FACT SHEET, FINAL RULE: PREVENTION OF SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION AND TITLE V
GREENHOUSE GAS TAILORING RULE 1 (2010), http://www.epa.gov/nsr/documents/20100413fs.pdf.
140. Press Release, U.S. EPA, supra note 138. Under the new rule, facilities already required to obtain Clean
Air Act operating permits must also “include GHGs in their permit if they increase these emissions by at least
75,000 tons per year (tpy).” Id.
141. Id. The second phase limits coverage to large stationary GHG emitters—i.e., new facilities emitting at
least 100,000 tpy, as well as all modifications to existing facilities that effectively increase GHG emissions by at
least 75,000 tpy. Id.
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facilities must use the “best available control technologies” to control their GHG
emissions.142
The EPA announced the GHG permitting rule following a joint April rulemaking with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) that
establishes a national GHG emissions standard for light-duty vehicles, such as
passenger cars and light trucks.143 The joint rule aims to substantially reduce GHG
emissions and improve fuel economy in light-duty vehicles by setting stringent CO2
tailpipe standards for vehicles manufactured between model years 2012 and 2016.144
According to the agencies, this rule is consistent with President Obama’s agenda to
address global climate change.145
iv. the european union’s environmental disclosure system

The E.U. has adopted a comprehensive approach to corporate environmental
reporting with its Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (“EMAS”).146 EMAS is a
voluntary program premised on offering participants marketplace advantage
incentives.147 Unlike the U.S. disclosure system, which serves to ensure the validity
and adequacy of financial investment information made available to the public, the
E.U.’s EMAS program offers a mutually beneficial arrangement for both investors
and the community’s environmental objectives as it aims to improve the way a
company addresses environmental matters while providing direct benefits to
participating organizations.148 Participants agree to meet specific criteria in exchange
for the benefits of limited regulatory controls.149 For example, corporate participants
must first conduct a thorough environmental review, assessing the issues, impact,
and performance of each industrial site—i.e., property on which a company carries

142.
143.

Id.
See id.; see also U.S. EPA, EPA AND NHTSA FINALIZE HISTORIC NATIONAL PROGRAM TO REDUCE
GREENHOUSE GASES AND IMPROVE FUEL ECONOMY FOR CARS AND TRUCKS 1 (2010), available at
http://www.epa.gov/oms/climate/regulations/420f10014.pdf [hereinafter U.S. EPA, EPA AND NHTSA].
144. U.S. EPA, EPA AND NHTSA, supra note 143, at 1. The EPA estimates that the national GHG tailpipe
emissions program will achieve an approximately 21 percent reduction in GHG emissions by 2030. Light-Duty
Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg.
25,324, 25,328 (May 7, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts 85, 86, 600, and at 49 C.F.R. pts 531, 533, 536, 537,
538).
145. See Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy
Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. at 25,324 (“This joint Final Rule is consistent with the National Fuel Efficiency Policy
announced by President Obama on May 19, 2009, responding to the country’s critical need to address global
climate change and to reduce oil consumption.”).
146. Case, supra note 80, at 402.
147. See EUROPA, Environment, EMAS, Executive Summary, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/emas/
about/summary_en.htm (last visited May 19, 2010) [hereinafter EUROPA, Executive Summary].
148. Bray, supra note 20, at 664.
149. Case, supra note 80, at 402 (noting that participants receive the benefit of limited regulatory controls in
exchange for adhering to environmental auditing and reporting standards).
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out its industrial activities.150 From the review, companies develop environmental
policy statements, initiate an “environmental programme” for each enrolled site,
and create an environmental management system for each site.151 Participants must
conduct internal environmental audits for each site every three years and subject
each program site to external audits by independent environmental “verifiers.”152
Finally, and probably most importantly, companies enrolled in the program must
disclose the verified audit results to the public by way of standardized
“environmental statements.”153 As of 2001, all public and private corporations are
eligible to participate in EMAS.154
By implementing EMAS, the European Commission recognized that
“[e]nvironmental concerns, growing public pressure and regulatory measures are
changing the way people do business around the world.”155 Benefits under EMAS
include increased customer confidence, improved compliance with environmental
legislation, sustained competitiveness by meeting customer demands for environmental management, lower costs, and less regulation.156 Costs of the program
include external costs, registration fees, and internal costs associated with
implementing and maintaining the program.157
v. analysis

Although many federal environmental laws now require companies to report
compliance with federal environmental standards, financial disclosure of risks
associated with environmental compliance is virtually nonexistent and far from
adequate.158 Moreover, in light of growing efforts by states and the federal
government to address climate change concerns,159 the environmental regulatory
landscape will likely grow even more complex.160 Consequently, corporate managers
will face additional environmental risks and potential liabilities.161 Policymakers and

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Bray, supra note 20, at 664–65.
Id. at 665.
Id. at 665–66.
Id. at 666–67.
Surya Deva, Sustainable Good Governance and Corporations: An Analysis of Asymmetries, 18 GEO. INT’L
ENVTL. L. REV. 707, 734 (2006) (noting that EMAS has been available since 1995 but was originally restricted to
industrial-sector companies).
155. EUROPA, Executive Summary, supra note 147.
156. EUROPA, Environment, EMAS, Frequently Asked Questions, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/emas/
tools/faq_en.htm#benefits (last visited May 19, 2010).
157. Id.
158. See THE CORPORATE LIBRARY, supra note 16, at 34.
159. Id. at 1–2.
160. See infra Part VI.A.
161. See Mark Latham, Environmental Liabilities and the Federal Securities Laws: A Proposal for Improved
Disclosure of Climate Change-Related Risks, 39 ENVTL. L. 647, 661–62 (2009) (noting that regulation of GHG
emissions under the Clean Air Act “would mean . . . that businesses would face a new set of highly complex state
regulations that . . . would impose enormous compliance costs necessary to reduce carbon dioxide emissions”).
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regulators can no longer ignore the need for heightened corporate disclosure
requirements. This Comment argues that current corporate disclosure
requirements with regard to environmental matters are outmoded in the face of
climate change developments and must be updated to best serve investor interests
while conferring corporate benefits.162 More specifically, Congress should amend the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, a legislative measure aimed at enhancing the quality of
financial documents, to require that: (1) publicly traded companies disclose their
GHG emissions as potential, material environmental risks; and (2) the SEC and
EPA formally agree to share relevant information related to environmental risks.163
A. Inadequate Environmental Disclosure Under the Materiality Standard
Currently, federal securities laws maintain an element of management discretion on
the issue of materiality.164 In the MD&A sections of financial filings, a registrant
company must discuss “any known trends, or any known demands, commitments,
events, or uncertainties” that, in the judgment of management, are reasonably likely
to materially impact its liquidity, financial condition, or operating results.165
Similarly, other items of Regulation S-K contain references to the materiality
standard.166 The SEC has been reluctant to expand existing environmental reporting
requirements to require the disclosure of risks and uncertainties beyond the TSC
Industries materiality standard, however.167 In 2002, SEC regulators stated that “a
matter should be disclosed in the MD&A unless the management has concluded
that such [an] item cannot reasonably impose a material impact on the
company.”168 Yet in 2003, the SEC reviewed the 2002 10-K annual reports of
Fortune 500 companies and found generally inadequate reporting of environmental
liabilities in MD&A sections.169
In 2004, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) issued a report
describing, inter alia, its assessment of the SEC’s environmental disclosure
requirements, the extent of corporate environmental disclosures, and the SEC’s
enforcement of compliance with disclosure requirements.170 The GAO found that

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

See infra Parts V.A–B.
See infra Part VI.
See supra Part II.
17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2009).
See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.101, 229.103 (including the materiality provisions of sections 101 and 103).
See Eric B. Rothenberg et al., Environmental Issues in Business Transactions Under U.S. Law, 5 WIS.
ENVTL. L.J. 121, 147 (1998) (noting that within the insurance sector, the SEC has been reluctant to require full
environmental disclosure, even in the quantity and types of environmental insurance claims, as well as estimates
of associated costs to cover such claims). SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro has specifically stated that the SEC
would not redefine its “long-standing interpretations of materiality.” Schapiro, supra note 85.
168. SANFORD LEWIS, TOXIC STOCK SYNDROME 8 (2008).
169. Schwartz & Mussio, Environmental Disclosure, supra note 52, at 286.
170. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-808, ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE: SEC SHOULD
EXPLORE WAYS TO IMPROVE TRACKING AND TRANSPARENCY OF INFORMATION 2 (2004).
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stakeholders disagreed as to the adequacy of the SEC’s disclosure requirements for
environmental matters, with socially responsible investors objecting that the
Commission’s requirements are too flexible and too narrowly scoped.171 Likewise,
the GAO could not determine the extent to which companies disclosed
environmental information because “researchers [had] no way of knowing what
environmental information [was] (1) potentially subject to disclosure and (2)
material in the context of a company’s specific circumstances” without direct access
to company records.172 Finally, the GAO could not determine whether the SEC’s
efforts to monitor and enforce corporate compliance with environmental disclosure
requirements were adequate.173
More recently, Ceres and the Environmental Defense Fund commissioned a
study that examined the climate risk disclosures of 100 companies in the electric
utilities, coal, oil and gas, transportation, and insurance industries.174 The study
found very limited disclosure as “28 [companies] had no discussion of risk
assessment, 52 described no actions to address climate change, and 59 made no
mention of [GHG] emissions or a climate change position.”175 At best, the study
qualitatively described the level of climate risk disclosure in any given industry
sector as “fair.”176 Most filings across the five sectors “lacked the level of detail that
investors require.”177 The study concluded that corporate climate risk disclosure is
largely inadequate because “the SEC has failed to take actions to highlight its
importance.”178
The SEC has only recently spoken on the materiality of climate risks for the
purposes of corporate disclosures with its February 2010 Release.179 SEC Chairman,
Mary Schapiro, made it clear that the Release was simply intended “to provide
clarity and enhance consistency” of reporting.180 The Release represents an
improvement of, but not an adequate remedy for, corporate environmental
disclosure woes.181 Because the Release neither creates nor modifies disclosure
requirements, it serves to remind publicly traded companies of their obligation to

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 9, 12.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 23.
THE CORPORATE LIBRARY, supra note 16, at 34.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, Securities Act Release No.
9106, Exchange Act Release No. 61,469, 75 Fed. Reg. 6,290 (Feb. 8, 2010).
180. Schapiro, supra note 85.
181. In addition to monitoring the impact of the February Release on corporate disclosures, the SEC plans
to hold a public roundtable on climate change disclosures later this spring. Commission Guidance Regarding
Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg. at 6,297. The Commission has yet to determine “whether
further guidance or rulemaking relating to climate change disclosure is necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.” Id.
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disclose material information to shareholders.182 The SEC goes one step further and
officially adopts the position that risks associated with climate change and related
developments may qualify as material information subject to disclosure.183 The
Release gives examples of situations arising from climate change developments that
may trigger an analysis of materiality.184 The question of disclosure, however,
remains inextricably tied to the Commission’s long-standing interpretations of
materiality.185
Preceding the Release, government and stakeholder-sponsored studies confirmed what many scholars already concluded—that disclosure of environmental
risks under the current materiality standard remains largely inadequate.186 As the
SEC has indicated, however, that standard still applies today.187 Materiality hinges
on the substantial likelihood that Joe the Investor would consider the fact-at-issue
important enough to factor into his decision-making.188 Joe finds himself in good
company these days as more investors voice their dissatisfaction with the level at
which U.S. companies disclose their environmental risks, especially climate risks, to
the SEC.189 The time has come for change, and as discussed below, better disclosure
is better for everyone.
B. Benefits of Communicating Risk
Adequate disclosure of environmental risks can benefit both public companies and
investors in several ways. For example, environmental risk disclosure can reflect a
general corporate awareness for social and environmental responsibility.190 With
more companies taking on the “green” initiative, socially responsible investors are
likely to respond positively to the actions of environmentally responsible

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 6,295–97.
Schapiro, supra note 85.
See, e.g., Jeffrey M. McFarland. Warming up to Climate Change Risk Disclosure, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. &
FIN. L. 281, 292–93 (2009) (“Researchers have decried the lack of meaningful public reporting on climate
change risks. Several coalitions have engaged in efforts to improve climate change risk disclosure.” (footnote
omitted)). See generally Mitchell F. Crusto, Endangered Green Reports: “Cumlative Materiality” in Corporate
Environmental Disclosure After Sarbanes-Oxley, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 483 (2005) (discussing the status and
important shortfalls of corporate environmental disclosure under current federal securities laws and the
materiality standard).
187. See Schapiro, supra note 85.
188. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
189. See McFarland, supra note 186, at 303–06 (providing an overview of a petition to the SEC by “[a]
collection of institutional investors, governmental officers, attorneys general, environmental organizations and
non-profit groups” seeking “interpretive guidance for reporting climate change issues under existing mandatory
disclosure rules and regulations”).
190. See Monsma & Olson, supra note 58, at 156 (“[I]t has long been argued that information about the
social and environmental responsibilities of a company does not bear upon its financial condition or the
economic value of an investment because such information is ethical, perhaps even self-serving, rather than
financially relevant.”).
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companies.191 Communication of risks would presumably lead to better-informed
investor decision-making.192 By keeping the public well-informed through
transparent reporting, companies can mitigate investors’ fears and apprehensions
associated with uncertainty, particularly those companies most directly affected by
the impact of climate change.193 As one scholar noted, a transparent market can also
prevent corporate assets from being undervalued, and the accurate pricing of stocks
can lead to decreased market volatility.194
1. Benefits to Investors
Shareholders benefit from greater disclosure because federal disclosure
requirements are meant to protect investors.195 With regard to environmental
matters, shareholders and institutional investors seem to favor greater disclosure of
environmental risks, particularly those associated with climate change.196 The
number of socially responsible investors who “specifically seek information about
company management commitments and [social and environmental]
performance” continues to grow.197 In fact, several financiers expressly invest in
companies skilled in addressing environmental issues.198 Moreover, within the last
decade, institutional investors have petitioned the SEC to issue interpretive
guidance on when companies should disclose climate risks.199 For example, on
November 23, 2009, a coalition of twenty institutional investors filed a
supplemental petition to the SEC, asking the agency to further clarify what
constitutes climate-related “material risks.”200 A company’s proper disclosure of
known or anticipated material risks will in turn allow investors to fully assess the

191. See generally Alex Williams, Buying into the Green Movement, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2007, § 9, at 1
(describing the green movement and the criticisms that call into question the supposed environmental benefits
of green consumerism).
192. See infra Part V.B.1.
193. See Bray, supra note 20, at 668–69. Risk managers assume the responsibility of putting risks in
perspective for the public by providing trusted expert opinions and explaining management actions to manage
those risks. Id. at 669.
194. David A. Westbrook, Telling All: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Ideal of Transparency, 2004 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 441, 451–52 (positing that reduced volatility through consistently accurate stock pricing would
“preclude[] the mania and correction that constitute financial crises”).
195. See Monsma & Olson, supra note 58, at 140–41 (“Over and over again, investors are said to be
protected by the ‘full and fair disclosure of all material information.’”).
196. Martin, supra note 19, at 981–83; Katherine P. O’Halleran, Increased Scrutiny on Company Disclosure of
Environmental Liabilities, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Winter 2005, at 72, 73.
197. See Monsma & Olson, supra note 58, at 160.
198. Thomas, supra note 31, at 902.
199. Martin, supra note 19, at 981–82 (“Since 2004, a group of institutional investors has been pushing the
SEC to issue guidance on how and when companies should report risks associated with climate change.”).
200. Press Release, Investor Network on Climate Risk, Major Investors Call for SEC to Require Disclosure of
Companies’ Climate Risks and Opportunities (Nov. 23, 2009), http://www.incr.com/Page.aspx?pid=1152.
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investment risks they are taking.201 The SEC issued its climate change disclosure
interpretive guidance earlier this year in response to these investor petitions.202
In the absence of adequate disclosure requirements, there is an asymmetry in
information between investors and firms where investors face the disadvantage of
not having all the facts necessary to determine a firm’s true value.203 Increased
disclosure of risks can serve to level the playing field by promoting transparency,
which in turn assists investors in making well-informed investment decisions.204 In a
fully transparent market, investors “have all the information in the possession of the
company” necessary to accurately value a security.205 Moreover, as markets become
more transparent, their efficiency improves.206 The accurate valuation of securities
leads to decreased market volatility, as “there is little reason to pay anything more,
or less, than the asking price.”207 Greater transparency as a result of heightened risk
disclosure also boosts investor confidence by minimizing the fear that they will be
defrauded in the marketplace.208 Essentially, adequate environmental risk disclosure
reduces investor risk and serves the public interest.209
2. Benefits to Corporations
Increased environmental risk disclosure requirements can also benefit corporations.
First, adequate assessment and disclosure of risks for the purposes of public
disclosure and accountability will likely prompt U.S. companies to conduct more
critical analyses of their corporate behavior.210 For example, executive decisionmakers may conduct cost-benefit analyses and factor in the public response and
consequences of their decisions, particularly if there is a chance their actions could
lead to subsequent litigation or decreased investments.211 Since 2007, federal courts

201.
202.

See id.
Press Release, CSRwire, SEC Issues Ground-Breaking Guidance Requiring Corporate Disclosure of
Material Climate Change Risks and Opportunities (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.csrwire.com/press/
press_release/28746.
203. See Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More
Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 152–53 (2006) (explaining that disclosure
can play a role in leveling the informational playing field so that investors have equal access to information and
“can then make informed valuation judgments about the price of securities”).
204. Id. at 152–53.
205. Westbrook, supra note 194, at 448–49.
206. Id. at 449.
207. Id. at 451.
208. Ripken, supra note 203, at 154.
209. Id. at 155.
210. See Mark A. Sargent, A Sense of Order: The Virtues and Limits of Doctrinal Analysis, 104 HARV. L. REV.
634, 639 (1990) (reviewing LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION (3d ed. 1989)).
211. See Barbara Ann White, Economic Efficiency and the Parameters of Fairness: A Marriage of Marketplace
Morals and the Ethic of Care, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 69 (2005) (observing that disclosure-mediated
transparency subjects companies to “public scrutiny and, in particular, to potential scrutiny by those
representing impacted individuals,” such that managers are aware “they will be held accountable for their
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have increasingly indicated that companies are no longer immune from climate
change-related litigation.212 For example, in Connecticut v. American Electric Power
Co., the Second Circuit allowed the state plaintiffs to sue six electric power
companies over their operation of fossil-fuel-fired power plants in twenty states
under the federal common law claim of public nuisance.213 A three-member panel of
the Fifth Circuit appeared to follow in the steps of the Second Circuit in Comer v.
Murphy Oil U.S.A.214 when it allowed a Mississippi class action public nuisance
lawsuit to proceed against insurance, oil, coal, and chemical companies for their
alleged contributions to property damages resulting from Hurricane Katrina.215
While both cases have yet to be decided on their merits, the circuit rulings can
potentially subject companies to new risks in environmental litigation.216 Because
litigation is costly, both companies and plaintiffs may favor federal intervention by
way of legislation regulating GHG emissions.217
In addition to insulating companies from domestic public nuisance litigation,
mandatory reporting can also benefit U.S.-registered corporate entities in the global
marketplace. In light of the E.U.’s GHG Emission Trading System (“ETS”),218 the
European community’s open trading market for GHG emissions,219 compliance

decisions,” thereby constraining “the evaluation and selection process of corporate decisions”); Cynthia A.
Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197,
1278 (1999) (noting that a corporation’s conduct in violation of various domestic statutes can yield negative
economic consequences such as “private litigation, government litigation, . . . reputational injuries, . . . and
various corollary effects such as institutional investor disinvestment, bond devaluations, and negative market
consequences,” which can not only affect the value of the company, but also its future economic performance).
212. See generally Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009) (allowing plaintiffs to
proceed with their public nuisance lawsuit against six electric power companies for their alleged contributions
to global warming).
213. Id. at 358 (“In this case, the States have properly asserted parens patriae standing with respect to a
public nuisance, and the ‘serious magnitude’ of the nuisance caused by climate change, as it has been alleged, is
apparent.”).
214. 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009).
215. Id. at 860–61, 879–80. As this issue goes to print, the Fifth Circuit leaves uncertain the fate of the class
action plaintiffs in Comer, following its announcement that the court lost quorum to hear the case en banc. See
supra note 19.
216. Koons, supra note 19.
217. See id.
218. EUROPA, Environment, Climate Change, Emission Trading System, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/
climat/emission/index_en.htm (last visited May 19, 2010). ETS is the cap-and-trade program created by the
E.U. to assist member states in their commitments to reduce GHG emissions pursuant to the Kyoto Protocol.
Press Release, EUROPA, Questions & Answers on Emissions Trading and National Allocation Plans (June 20,
2005), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/05/84&format=HTML&
aged=1&language. This Comment does not attempt to discuss the merits of the ETS cap-and-trade program.
For an assessment of ETS, including its controversies, see A. DENNY ELLERMAN & PAUL L. JOSKOW, PEW CTR. ON
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, THE EUROPEAN UNION’S EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEM IN PERSPECTIVE (2008),
available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/EU-ETS-In-Perspective-Report.pdf.
219. Created in 2005, Europe’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading program includes twenty-five member
state participants and covers over 10,000 facilities in six industry sectors. THE CORPORATE LIBRARY, supra note
16, at 1.
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with domestic and foreign GHG disclosure requirements would allow U.S.
companies to stay competitive in foreign markets.220 American multinational
corporations that conduct a significant amount of business in these foreign markets
incur additional regulatory risks because they are subject to international laws and
rules aimed at reducing GHG emissions.221 In fact, U.S. companies must assimilate
into these foreign cap-and-trade systems or face substantial profit losses from
possible exclusion from these markets.222 Scholars have pointed to empirical
research suggesting that greater disclosure would allow companies to expand their
presence in broader markets through attracting new investors.223 According to one
business school professor, “companies from low-disclosure jurisdictions that list on
exchanges with higher disclosure requirements tend to benefit substantially.”224
Additionally, heightened foreign disclosure requirements can significantly
impact U.S. companies that operate within the carbon or fossil fuel supply chain
through supply chain disruption.225 Consider the disruption to domestic U.S.
companies’ performance if a supplier operating in European markets fails to
properly disclose GHG emissions under the E.U.’s ETS and is subsequently
removed from the marketplace.226 Were the U.S. companies suddenly left to find
another supplier, the resulting commitment of time and resources to restore the
supply chain would lead to costly delays, and perhaps a loss of profits, or a drop in
stock prices, or both.227 Therefore, companies should identify and subsequently
disclose such supply chain-related risks so that they may develop proactive
strategies for managing those risks and remain competitive,228 especially when
investors appear to want more environmental disclosure.229
Both investors and publicly traded companies stand to benefit from greater
corporate environmental disclosures and the increase in market transparency that

220. Cf. LEWIS, supra note 168, at 27 (noting that failure by companies affected by the E.U. REACH
program, which regulates toxic chemicals in European markets, to disclose or pre-register certain chemicals and
substances covered under REACH will lead to product exclusion from E.U. markets).
221. Latham, supra note 161, at 662–63.
222. Cf. LEWIS, supra note 168, at 22 (noting that a U.S. Company like Dow Chemical would be affected by
the E.U.’s REACH program, as “European markets represent 36 percent of Dow Chemical’s sales and 10 percent
of the company’s assets, yet the company’s 2007 10-K filing does not discuss the potential impact of REACH.”).
223. Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 775, 823 (2006).
224. Id.
225. Cf. LEWIS, supra note 168, at 29 (concluding that for chemical companies, failure to disclose supply
chain risks leaves companies ill-prepared and likely to suffer significant business disruptions).
226. See supra note 220.
227. See Trevor W. Nagel & Elizabeth M. Kelley, The Impact of Globalization on Structuring, Implementing,
and Advising on Sourcing Arrangements, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 619, 620 n.4 (2007) (“[A] single error in one part . . .
of a complex supply chain can create large, rippling effects on a company’s global sales and distribution
operations.”).
228. See id.
229. See McFarland, supra note 186, at 281–82 (“Despite repeated requests from investor groups for more
disclosure, and despite increasing public interest in the effects of global warming, poor disclosure persists.”).

vol. 5 no. 2 2010

349

CHEN.PP3.DOC

6/14/2010 4:59 PM

Green SOX for Investors
would follow.230 Greater disclosure can result in the accurate market valuation of
corporate stocks, which, as some suggest, can lead to increased market stability.231
As the number of socially responsible investors who look to and depend on
corporate environmental disclosures continues to grow, so does the incentive for
companies to disclose fully their environmental risks.232 Investors see good
corporate citizenship, and companies remain competitive in the marketplace.233
C. Voluntary Reporting vs. Mandatory Reporting
Whether the government should require companies to report environmental risks
or simply encourage it depends on the likelihood that the policy will achieve the
desired effect. If the government opted for a voluntary reporting system, the burden
of “environmental reform” would shift to corporate entities.234 While the E.U.’s
EMAS has had some successes, it is only fair to mention that systems based on
voluntary reporting are not without weaknesses or criticism.235 At least one legal
scholar has observed that while EMAS compels more comprehensive environmental
reporting than the vague “materiality” standard in U.S. federal securities laws,
participation in the EMAS program has been “underwhelming.”236 One reason is a
lack of adequate incentives or external market rewards to participate in the
program.237 Furthermore, participants enrolled in the program have taken issue with
the reporting commitment under the program.238 While the EMAS program has
responded to the reporting concerns, scholars continue to doubt the “long-term
viability of . . . [such] a voluntary policy instrument.”239
Scholars have also noted that even within the U.S. mandatory “materiality”
reporting scheme, corporate efforts to voluntarily disclose environmental
performance have been largely without reform effect.240 As one law professor
commented, companies tend to selectively disclose aspects of their environmentally
related actions in the form of a “green report”—namely, a “glossy, unaudited

230. See Westbrook, supra note 194, at 453 (“[W]e should understand mandatory disclosure regimes as the
regulatory effort to increase transparency and thereby increase informational efficiency of markets. As the
transparency of a market increases, and all else being equal, we should see a decrease in trading volume and in
volatility.”).
231. See id. at 448–49.
232. See Monsma & Olson, supra note 58, at 160 (“Regardless of what level of disclosure the law demands,
the market is demanding far more social and environmental disclosure today.”).
233. Id. at 196.
234. See Bray, supra note 20, at 669.
235. Case, supra note 80, at 403.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 405.
239. Id. at 403–04.
240. See Crusto, supra note 186, at 500.
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showcase of corporate environmental good deeds.”241 These reports are often
misleading and geared toward favorably influencing investors and public opinion.242
Such voluntary disclosure can lead to “greenwashing”—where a company
misleadingly presents an environmentally responsible image when its activities are
less than environmentally friendly.243 Collectively, these doubts would suggest that a
mandatory reporting requirement would better facilitate the promotion of
corporate-led environmental reform.
Requiring environmental risk disclosure would allow the SEC to shore up gaps
and weaknesses in the existing federal reporting scheme.244 Studies indicate that the
current U.S. “materiality” reporting scheme is far from adequate.245 Stricter
mandatory disclosure requirements would not only circumvent the ambiguity of
the materiality standard,246 but also provide investors and stakeholders with more
information.247 Instead of relying on managerial discretion for materiality,
companies could in fact make full disclosures of their environmental risks and
liabilities. While mandatory disclosures would likely be more costly to companies,248
some scholars believe that mandatory reporting can result in market-enhancing
benefits such as “improv[ing] the monitoring capability of third parties, reduc[ing]
the costs for investors, and thereby lower[ing] the price for firms that raise
capital[,]” as well as increased venture capital financing.249
Additionally, mandatory reporting requirements can help ensure that investors
receive information that is both uniform and comparable. The difficulty in SEC
enforcement of existing environmental disclosure requirements may be due to the
fact that much discretion has been given to corporate managers, creating a lack of
uniformity in reporting. Thus, some have argued that because there is no clear duty
to disclose,250 there is discrepancy in the information companies choose to disclose
to investors.251 This puts investors at a disadvantage because they are unable to fully
compare information from different companies.252 Mandatory reporting can help

241.
242.
243.
244.

Id. at 483.
See id. at 483, 500.
Thomas P. Lyon & John W. Maxwell, Greenwash, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Summer 2007, at 9, 9.
See, e.g., Latham, supra note 161, at 702–03 (concluding that the current SEC regulatory framework
fails to ensure adequate disclosure of climate change risk).
245. See, e.g., THE CORPORATE LIBRARY, supra note 16, at 34.
246. See Monsma & Olson, supra note 58, at 140 (“Not surprisingly, courts are repeatedly asked to resolve
legal disagreements regarding the duty to disclose and the definition of materiality.”).
247. See Prentice, supra note 223, at 823 (“[E]mpirical studies strongly suggest that mandatory disclosure
works . . . because it generally results in increased disclosure.”).
248. See id. at 816 (noting that mandatory disclosure is “admittedly costly”).
249. See, e.g., id. at 820–23 (footnote omitted).
250. See, e.g., Monsma & Olson, supra note 58, at 161 (stating that a lack of uniformity in existing corporate
disclosures is “due in part to the widely held perception that such disclosure is voluntary and that there is no
duty to report this information as yet”).
251. Id. at 174.
252. Id.
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level the playing field and improve the quality and efficiency of information made
available to assist investors in their decision-making.253
vi. recommendations

While SOX generated momentum shortly after Congress enacted it, the Act does
not specifically address corporate environmental disclosure.254 Perhaps it should.
Existing provisions of SOX have been touted to “arm[] the public with a great
hammer to redress material omissions and misstatements in environmental
disclosures.”255 Given the previously discussed concerns over the SEC’s reluctance to
expand environmental disclosure requirements, the time has come to give the
“great hammer” teeth. In particular, concerns over global warming and climate
change have taken center stage,256 giving rise to a number of legislative and
regulatory initiatives to reduce GHG emissions.257 The growing complexities of
environmental compliance calls for congressional action to amend SOX to not only
mandate corporate disclosure of climate risks but also ensure that the SEC and EPA
collaborate efficiently to enforce these disclosure requirements.258
A. The Changing Regulatory Landscape
With the Obama Administration committed to mitigating the effects of climate
change,259 and the EPA beginning to regulate GHG emissions,260 it seems inevitable
that a national cap-and-trade policy will soon follow.261 In fact, legislation currently
pending before the 111th Congress aspires to reduce global warming pollution by
proposing, among other things, a trading scheme for GHGs.262 H.R. 2454, or the
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (“ACES”), would direct the EPA

253. See Prentice, supra note 223, at 819–20 (“Mandatory disclosure reduces search and information
processing costs for investors by requiring cheap, readily available, standardized, and relatively reliable
disclosure of information. Required disclosure . . . is needed to help defeat strategic disclosure.” (footnotes
omitted)).
254. Crusto, supra note 186, at 484–85.
255. Id. at 500.
256. Erich Birch, Air Quality Regulation in the United States, BUS. L. TODAY, July/Aug. 2007, at 13, 17
(“[T]he issue of climate change is now on center stage in scientific, political, and policy arenas.”).
257. THE CORPORATE LIBRARY, supra note 16, at 1–2.
258. See infra Part VI.B.
259. John M. Broder, Obama Affirms Climate Change Goals, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/19/us/politics/19climate.html.
260. See supra Part III.
261. See Schwartz & Mussio, Due Diligence, supra note 56, at 252 (“[I]t now appears likely that Congress will
pass federal greenhouse gas emissions regulation in the form of a cap and trade system, as favored by President
Obama.”).
262. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong.; Clean Energy Jobs and
American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. (2009).
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to cap GHG emissions (by annual tonnage) for specific activities.263 Emitters
covered under ACES may not exceed their allowances, though they may obtain and
trade offset credits.264 Similarly in the U.S. Senate, Senators John Kerry and Barbara
Boxer introduced a bill bearing close resemblance to H.R. 2454, on September 30,
2009.265 Known as the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act,266 S. 1733 called
for a greater reduction of GHG emissions than its House counterpart but also
provided for an allowance and offset trading system.267 S. 1733 is no longer active,268
but Senator Kerry and Senator Joe Lieberman recently introduced a new energy and
climate change bill—the American Power Act—which targets both energy and
environmental issues and includes, among other things, a carbon emissions
allowance and trading scheme.269 The bill also purports to set mandatory limits on
GHG emissions.270
If enacted, the proposed climate change legislation would obligate covered
entities to disclose additional environmental information—e.g., GHG emissions—
under the current “materiality” standard.271 After all, full disclosure of GHG
emissions would be part and parcel to a market for emissions allowances and thus

263. H.R. 2454 §§ 721–728 (describing the emissions allowance program). Entities covered under global
warming provisions of the bill include: all electricity sources; all stationary sources for petroleum-based or coalbased liquid fuel, petroleum coke, or natural gas liquid; stationary sources that deal in any of the enumerated
GHGs; stationary sources that emit above a certain tonnage of carbon dioxide equivalent of nitrogen trifluoride;
any geologic sequestration site; stationary sources in certain industrial manufacturing or production sectors;
certain chemical or petrochemical stationary sources; certain fossil fuel-fired combustion devices; qualifying
stationary sources involved in ethanol production, ferroalloy production, fluorinated gas production, food
processing, glass production, hydrogen production, iron and steel production, lead production, pulp and paper
manufacturing, and zinc production; and qualifying natural gas local distributors. Id. § 700(13).
264. Id. §§ 722–724.
265. See Govtrack.us, S. 1733: Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-1733 (last visited May 15, 2010).
266. Id.
267. See NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, S. 1733, CLEAN ENERGY JOBS & AMERICAN POWER ACT OF 2009:
OVERVIEW OF BILL RELEASED 9/30/09, at 1–2 (2009), http://fairclimateproject.org/blog/wp-content/
uploads/NWF_S.1733_overview.pdf; Jim Snyder, Senate Panel Passes Climate Bill as Republicans Continue
Boycott, THE HILL, Nov. 5, 2009, http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/66519-senate-panel-passes-climate-billas-gop-boycotts (noting that the Senate bill calls for a larger reduction in GHG emissions than the House
climate bill and that companies could buy permits to meet emissions targets).
268. Patrick Tutwiler, Climate Change Legislation: Where Does It Stand?, GOVTRACK INSIDER, Apr. 27, 2010,
http://www.govtrackinsider.com/articles/2010-04-27/climate-change.
269. Darren Samuelsohn, Kerry, Lieberman to End the Suspense with Climate Bill Rollout Today, N.Y. TIMES,
May 12, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/05/12/12climatewire-kerry-lieberman-to-end-the-suspense
-with-cli-19936.html?pagewanted=1.
270. Id.
271. See Bernie Hawkins et al., Disclosing Environmental Liabilities, BUS. L. TODAY, July/August 2009, at 61,
63 (noting that under a prior legislative attempt to create a national cap-and-trade GHG emissions program,
the SEC would have been required to “issue interpretive releases under Items 101 and 303 of Regulation S-K
clarifying that commitments to lower greenhouse gas emissions [were] considered material and that global
warming is a known trend”).
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information that a reasonable investor would want to know.272 But what about
companies outside the scope of the proposed trading scheme—how can the
materiality standard ensure adequate disclosure of their climate risks? The shifting
regulatory landscape is likely to have the greatest impact on the energy sector, since
energy-producing facilities tend to be among the largest emitters of GHGs.273
Because the costs of compliance with these new climate change regulations can be
substantial,274 one can expect the increased energy costs to affect the economy at
large.275 Thus, there is a need for businesses to disclose these climate risks and
liabilities to investors so they can adequately assess the value of the companies in
which they are investing.
Whether through new legislation or SOX, the stage is set for companies to
disclose their climate risks. Particularly with regard to GHG emissions, participants
in a cap-and-trade program, if Congress creates one, will not be able to escape the
materiality of disclosing their emissions276—even if Congress chooses to do nothing
more with SOX specifically. Congress should, however, consider amending SOX
regardless of how legislators proceed on the cap-and-trade proposals.
B. Mandatory Disclosure of GHG Emissions and Climate Risk
Even if Congress declines to establish an emissions trading scheme at this time,
amending SOX to require mandatory disclosure of climate risks will help protect
investors in a regulatory landscape that is expanding in response to global warming
and the need to regulate GHG emissions. Given that a number of states have already
taken the initiative to limit GHG emissions and/or mitigate climate change in other
ways,277 new federal regulations appear to be forthcoming.278 Because SOX purposely
aims to “protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate
disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws,”279 Congress should amend SOX to
mandate corporate disclosure of risks and liabilities related to climate change.

272.
273.
274.

See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, § 713, 111th Cong.
Latham, supra note 161, at 663.
Id. (noting that as the nation moves toward reducing GHG emissions, the regulatory risks to businesses
increase, which will lead to “a material increase in costs to businesses”). For example, major emitters of GHG
pollutants may need to install expensive control equipment in order to achieve the necessary reductions in
GHGs; others may need to pursue costly modifications. Id.
275. Id. (“The additional regulatory costs will . . . be passed along to consumers of energy, with large
customers—businesses—shouldering substantially higher energy costs.”).
276. See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
277. See Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, Securities Act Release No.
9106, Exchange Act Release No. 61,469, 75 Fed. Reg. 6,290, 6,290 n.7 (Feb. 8, 2010). For example, twenty-three
states are participating partners in three different regional GHG initiative programs. Id.
278. Latham, supra note 161, at 652 (noting that new sweeping federal regulations to GHG emissions are
inevitable).
279. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C. (2006)).
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Understandably, the scope of climate risk remains broad despite efforts to
classify the risks into general categories.280 Although the SEC has since provided
guidance on circumstances posing climate change-related risks that may trigger the
need for corporate disclosure, such disclosure still hinges on materiality.
Alternatively, Congress can directly require companies to report GHG emissions in
their SEC filings. Notably, the EPA has already adopted a mandatory reporting rule
for GHG emissions from certain industries and activities.281 Thus, the EPA has
already detailed both the metrics and guidelines for monitoring and reporting gas
emissions,282 so corporate disclosure of the same information should be
straightforward. However, the EPA’s mandatory reporting rule does not actually
regulate or limit GHG emissions.283 The agency has only recently taken steps to
regulate GHG emissions from the largest stationary emitters and from the
transportation sector.284 Still, corporate managers not directly affected by the new
rules may question the necessity of disclosing their GHG emissions on the basis of
materiality. Thus, specifically amending SOX to require disclosure of GHG
emissions to the SEC in corporate financial statements is a logical step.285
Finally, Congress should also amend SOX to authorize and direct the SEC to
enter into a formal agreement with the EPA to share information. Presently, these
two agencies lack such an arrangement,286 which has led to a suboptimal exchange of
information, particularly information related to enforcement of environmental
compliance.287 As the GAO observed in its 2004 report, the exchange of information
broke down in part because the SEC did not find facility-specific data particularly
useful when it could not readily identify the parent company.288 As some individuals
have already observed, there is a compatibility issue between the EPA’s tracking
method and that of the SEC, lending to the argument that the agencies need to
streamline data sharing.289 The SEC previously indicated that it would consider
taking better advantage of EPA data.290 Thus, a formal agreement to exchange

280.
281.
282.

THE CORPORATE LIBRARY, supra note 16, at 2–3; see supra text accompanying note 17.
See supra Part III.
See generally Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,260, 56,288–90 (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pts 86, 87, 89, 90, 94, 98, 1033, 1039, 1042, 1045, 1048, 1051, 1054, 1065).
283. Id. at 52,260 (“The rule does not require control of greenhouse gases, rather it requires only that
sources above certain threshold levels monitor and report emissions.”).
284. See supra Part III.
285. Latham, supra note 161, at 652.
286. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 170, at 28.
287. While the EPA at one time provided the SEC with enforcement-related data on a quarterly basis, now,
“information sharing occurs less frequently and is focused on specific legal proceedings, such as those involving
monetary sanctions for environmental violations.” Id.
288. Id.
289. Michael J. Viscuso, Note, Scrubbing the Books Green: A Temporal Evaluation of Corporate Environmental
Disclosure Requirements, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 879, 891 (2007) (noting that experts have already made this
streamlining argument).
290. Monsma & Olson, supra note 58, at 153.
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information would prompt the agencies to seek ways to resolve the data sharing
problem, which would ultimately improve the coordination between the SEC and
EPA.291 As the principal federal environmental regulatory agency, the EPA can
greatly assist the SEC in its enforcement of corporate compliance with heightened
environmental disclosure requirements under the proposed amendments to SOX.
vii. conclusion

Corporate disclosures of environmental risks are grossly inadequate under current
federal securities laws, while foreign governments, such as the E.U., have recognized
and adopted systems that encourage companies to report certain environmental
risks in the marketplace.292 That said, the U.S. reporting scheme is not without some
mandatory environmental disclosure requirements.293 There is, however, a big
catch—an unclear threshold of “materiality” that must be met before these
requirements are triggered.294 While the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley has led to
improved corporate governance and accountability, the shift toward increased
activism by socially responsible investors and recent legislative and regulatory
efforts to mitigate GHG emissions necessitate a tightening of corporate
requirements for the dissemination of environmental risk information to the
public.295 Greater access to this information will help protect investors more
effectively, as well as ensure that businesses remain competitive.296 This Comment
posits a statutory mechanism by which the SEC may promulgate more effective
rules and regulations to address a long-standing problem that, out of necessity,
must be addressed in order to help the United States economy better respond to a
changing global environment.


291. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 170, at 23 (observing only sporadic efforts made by
the EPA and SEC to coordinate improving environmental disclosure).
292. See supra Part IV.
293. See supra Part II.
294. See supra Part II.
295. See supra Part IV.B.
296. See supra Part IV.B.
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